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A Tragi-Comedy of Errors
Erodes Self-Execution of
Treaties: MedellÍn v. Texas and
Beyond
John Quigley *
The 2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Medellín v.
Texas has generated concern that the doctrine of self-execution
of treaties is being eviscerated. The Court’s decision involved
misapplication of that doctrine in a case in which self-execution
should not have been center stage in the first place. The case
should have turned on presidential power, not on selfexecution. The Court hinted at a new and stricter standard for
finding treaty provisions to be self-executing. The Court
purported to be acting consistent with its own precedents on
standards for self-execution but analyzed the treaty provision at
issue in a manner at odds with precedents, inappropriately
concluding that it was not self-executing. In a series of cases
arising since Medellín involving treaties as between private
parties, the lower federal courts have, appropriately, disregarded
the Medellín decision and have continued to apply treaties as
required by the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.
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The unfortunate analysis of treaty self-execution given by the
Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas was the last in a series of
missteps in the case. The prior missteps should have kept the case
from reaching the Court. The Court itself then produced an opinion
out of step with its own case law, without explaining, or perhaps even
understanding, the extent to which it was undermining the traditional
analysis of self-execution of treaties under the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s errors are sufficiently egregious
that it may not be unrealistic to anticipate that in future cases the
analysis in Medellín v. Texas may be limited or ignored. This article,
after analyzing Medellín v. Texas itself, traces post-Medellin cases in
the lower courts.
Medellín v. Texas came out of more than a decade of litigation
both in the United States and in international institutions relating to
the access of foreign nationals under arrest to consular officials of
their home country. The issue before the Court in Medellín v. Texas
was the domestic enforceability of an international decision on that
subject. This earlier consular access litigation set the stage for
Medellín v. Texas, and it is with it that this article begins.

I. CONTEXT OF THE SELF-EXECUTION ISSUE: CONSULAR
ACCESS CLAIMS
The context for Medellín v. Texas, though not the issues in
dispute in the case itself, was consular access for foreign nationals
accused of crime in the United States. Access to a consular official is
provided for in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR), a multilateral treaty to which most states of the world are
party. 1 Authorities arresting a foreign national are required to inform
the individual of a right to contact a consular office of the individual’s
home country. 2 The reason for this procedure is to allow consular
1.

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.

2.

Id. art. 36.
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officials to provide assistance during the pre-trial phase, the trial
phrase if a trial occurs, and beyond. 3
The legal issue that led ultimately to Medellín v. Texas was that
of the legal consequences of the arresting authority’s failure to inform
a foreign national about consular access. Beginning in the mid-1990s,
lawyers in the United States working through the Texas Resource
Center took on the cases of a number of foreign nationals who had
been convicted of murder in Texas and sentenced to death, but who
had not been informed upon arrest about consular access. These
lawyers argued that this failure required a remedy, like other
procedural failures in criminal cases. 4
Lawyers elsewhere in the United States followed suit. Some
sought to suppress a pre-trial statement for failure to inform about
consular access, filing a suppression motion pre-trial, or raising the
issue on appeal. 5 Others challenged, post-trial, the imposition of
capital punishment, on the theory that participation by a consul
might have led to more solid evidence in mitigation. 6 The
Government of Mexico, which maintains an extensive network of
consular offices in the United States, took an active role in supporting
legal action on behalf of its nationals in these situations.
Results were mixed, both in the trial courts, and in courts hearing
appeals or habeas corpus petitions of those already convicted. In most
instances, the courts denied relief. Some courts denied on the basis
that consular access was not a right pertaining to an individual, or at
least not a right of constitutional dimension. Other courts denied on
the basis that the issue had been procedurally defaulted by not being
raised at an earlier stage, or that a consul’s participation would not
have provided any real assistance. 7
In 1998, the Government of Paraguay approached the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), seeking to bar Virginia from
executing a Paraguayan national, Angel Breard, who faced imminent
execution for capital murder. Breard had not been informed about
consular access upon arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals had denied
relief on the grounds that Breard did not raise the consular access
3.

See LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 147–
50 (2008); 7 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§
412, 415, 423, 424, 443, 444, 453; JOHN QUIGLEY, WILLIAM J. ACEVES &
S. ADELE SHANK, THE LAW OF CONSULAR ACCESS: A DOCUMENTARY
GUIDE 19–21 (2010).

4.

See, e.g., Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996).

5.

See, e.g., State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001).

6.

See, e.g., Madej v. Schomig, 223 F.Supp.2d 968, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

7.

See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d at 520; Murphy v. Netherland, 116
F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997); State v. Loza, No. CA96-10-214, 1997 WL
634348 (Butler Cty. Ct. App. 1997).

405

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of Treaties

issue in his initial habeas corpus petition. 8 The ICJ had jurisdiction,
because both Paraguay and the United States were party not only to
the VCCR but to an Optional Protocol that allows states party to the
VCCR to sue each other for violation of consular obligations. 9 The
ICJ issued an interim (injunctive) order asking the United States to
refrain from carrying out the execution. 10 The U.S. Supreme Court
declined to issue a stay of execution, finding that Breard’s consular
access claim had been procedurally defaulted for not being filed in the
time required by the laws of Virginia. 11 After the Governor of Virginia
denied clemency, the execution was carried out. 12
A few months earlier, the Government of Mexico had initiated
action on the consular access issue at the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. Functioning under the Organization of American
States (OAS), this Court sits in San Jose, Costa Rica, and has
jurisdiction to render advisory opinions on any treaty “concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states.” 13 The
Government of Mexico sought an opinion about legal remedies
required for failure to inform a foreign national about consular access
in capital cases. In October 1999, the Court issued an advisory
opinion, saying that the VCCR consular access provision, while
creating obligations between states, also gives a right to the foreign
national. The Court said that the execution of a foreign national who
had not been informed of the right of consular access would be
unlawful as an arbitrary deprivation of life. 14
By that date, Germany had filed against the United States in the
ICJ, on behalf of a German national who faced imminent execution in
Arizona. Like Paraguay, Germany was party to the VCCR and its
Optional Protocol. As in the Paraguay case, the ICJ issued an interim
order against execution while the case was pending. 15 Germany sued
8.

Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 620 (4th Cir. 1997).

9.

Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.

10.

See Case Concerning Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para.
v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 348 (June 9).

11.

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).

12.

David Stout, Clemency Denied, Paraguayan Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1998, at A18.

13.

American Convention on Human Rights, art. 64(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.

14.

Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 16, ¶ 7 (Oct. 1, 1999).

15.

See LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Interim Protection Order, 1999 I.C.J.
9 (Mar. 3).
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in the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking enforcement of the interim order,
but the Court found Germany was not in a position to sue. 16 The
German national, Walter LaGrand, was executed, but the ICJ case
continued, resulting in a 2001 judgment in which the ICJ said that
individual rights are at issue in the obligation to inform about
consular access and that a remedy is required. In the case of a
conviction of a foreign national who was not informed about consular
access, the ICJ said the resulting obligation is “to allow the review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account
of the violation. . . .” 17
Petitions had also been filed in another OAS institution, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, on behalf of foreign
nationals sentenced to death in the United States but who had not
been informed about consular access. The Commission has jurisdiction
to hear complaints of rights violations against OAS member states. In
two cases of foreign nationals sentenced to death in the United States,
these petitions resulted in Commission decisions, one in 2002 and a
second in 2003, that the individuals must be afforded a new trial or
released from custody. 18 In each case, the United States informed the
Commission that it did not intend to comply.
In 2003 as well, Mexico filed in the ICJ on behalf of fifty Mexican
nationals under sentence of death in the United States, the case being
styled Avena and Other Mexican Nationals. 19 Like Paraguay and
Germany, Mexico was party to the VCCR and its Optional Protocol.
In a 2004 judgment, the ICJ repeated the entitlement to a remedy for
individuals who were not informed about consular access, and the ICJ
specified—something it had not done in the LaGrand case—that the
remedy must be by the judicial branch if such is sought. 20
In 2006, the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court again in two
cases that the Court combined for argument. In one, a case from
Virginia, the foreign national had filed an untimely habeas corpus
petition under procedural rules of Virginia. In the other, a case from
Oregon, a foreign national sought the suppression of a confession and
16.

See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111–12
(1999).

17.

La Grand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June
27).

18.

Martinez Villareal v. United States, Case 11.753, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 52/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. ¶ 86 (2003);
Fierro v. United States, Case 11.331, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 99/03, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114 Doc. 70 rev. 1 ¶ 72(1) (2003).

19.

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Application
Instituting Proceedings, 2003 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 281(1) (Jan. 9).

20.

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 65–
66 (Mar. 31).

407

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of Treaties

had raised the matter in a timely manner. The European Union filed
an amicus curiae brief seeking compliance with the ICJ judgments in
LaGrand and Avena. 21 In the Virginia case, the U.S. Supreme Court
said that the petition was time-barred (a procedural default). In the
Oregon case, the Court said that suppression is not required as a
remedy for a violation of the VCCR consular access provision; the
Court assumed arguendo that that provision was self-executing but
made no ruling on that point, deciding the case instead with respect
to remedy. 22

II. THE PRESIDENT SEEKS IMPLEMENTATION OF AVENA
Jose Medellín, one of the Mexican nationals named by the
Government of Mexico in Avena, filed a habeas corpus petition for
relief on the basis of the Avena ICJ judgment. After losing in the
lower courts, he went to the U.S. Supreme Court. The European
Union filed a brief seeking compliance with the Avena injunction to
provide judicial review and reconsideration. The U.S. Solicitor
General appeared against Medellín. 23 While the case was before the
Court, however, President George W. Bush sent his Attorney General
a memorandum indicating that the United States, recognizing an
obligation under the U.N. Charter, should implement Avena by action
of the courts of the states in which a particular foreign national was
convicted. 24 U.N. Charter Article 94 requires a state that is party to a
case before the ICJ to comply with a judgment that might be
rendered. 25
On the basis of President Bush’s memorandum, Medellín filed a
new habeas corpus petition in Texas. Medellín’s lawyers evidently
regarded the president’s memorandum as altering the situation in
Medellín’s favor. Instead of Medellín as an individual making a claim
against Texas, now the president was espousing Medellín’s cause as
that of the federal government. Their decision to file a new habeas
corpus action based on the president’s memorandum led the U.S.
21.

See Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the
International Community in Support of Petitioners, Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51).

22.

See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).

23.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928).

24.

Memorandum for the Attorney General, Compliance with the Decision
of the International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available
at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/
20050228-18.html. See also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–32
(2008).

25.

U.N. Charter art. 9, para. 1.
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Supreme Court, in a five-to-four ruling, to terminate proceedings, to
afford the Texas court an opportunity to provide the relief Medellín
sought. 26 Justice O’Connor, along with three of her colleagues,
dissented from the dismissal and in her dissent wrote sympathetically
about self-execution of the obligation to inform about consular access,
and about the need to circumvent state rules on procedural default. 27
Acting on Medellín’s new habeas corpus petition, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals decided not to comply with President Bush’s
wish that the relevant state court provide review and reconsideration.
The Texas court said that Medellín had procedurally defaulted and
that no law outside of Texas could prevail over its procedural law.28
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Medellín a second
time. The European Union filed again, and the U.S. Attorney General
did as well. 29 This second Medellín proceeding in the Supreme Court
was unusual. Although it was in form a habeas corpus action initiated
by Medellín, the Solicitor General participated and argued that the
decision reflected in the president’s memorandum, aimed as it was at
enforcing a treaty obligation of the United States, was binding on
Texas. Thus, the case related as much to the power of the federal
government as it did to the rights of Medellín as an individual. The
United States, in its brief as amicus curiae, argued that the Texas
court was required to provide the review requested by President Bush
solely on the basis of the president’s obligation and power to comply
with UN Charter Article 94. 30
In a six-to-three ruling, the Court rejected Medellín’s petition.31
The Court was now in a different composition in this ruling on the
second certiorari petition by Medellín. Since the first grant of
certiorari, Justice O’Connor had retired and had been replaced by
Justice Alito.
To reach that result, the Court sidelined the issue of the
president’s power. The Court framed the issue in the case to be that
of whether the U.N. Charter Article 94 obligation was self-executing;
the Court said it was not. Only then did the court address the power
of the president and said that, since the Article 94 obligation is not
self-executing, the president may not require Texas to comply with it.
“[T]he executive,” the Court declared, “cannot unilaterally execute a
26.

See Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661–67 (2005).

27.

Id. at 686–90 (O’Connor, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).

28.

Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 342–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

29.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984).

30.

See id. at 8–21.

31.

See generally Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic effect.” 32 The United
States did not regard as relevant whether the Article 94 obligation
was or was not self-executing. 33
A.

The Obligation to Review and Reconsider

The remedy that the Solicitor General
enforce was a mild one at best. The ICJ in
conviction of a serious offense was gained
consular access obligations, the courts must
in light of the violation:

and Medellín sought to
Avena said that when a
absent compliance with
“review and reconsider”

[T]he legal consequences of this breach have to be examined and
taken into account in the course of review and reconsideration.
The Court considers that it is the judicial process that is suited
to this task. 34

The ICJ did not require a reversal. It did not indicate how the
violation must be “taken into account” in relation to the judicial
proceedings before a remedy would be required, or even what that
remedy had to be.
The ICJ did not indicate whether the violation must be found to
have impacted the proceedings in some specific way. If that were to
be required, a reviewing court would have to speculate about what a
consul might have done. In the Paraguay case before the ICJ, the
United States had asserted, in oral argument on Paraguay’s request
for an interim order, that one cannot reliably determine after the fact
what impact the participation of a consul might have had. The
United States said, “[i]t would be unworkable for a court to attempt
to determine reliably what a consular officer would have done and
whether it would have made a difference.” 35 Some U.S. courts have
recognized this difficulty. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
said in one case that it rejected any approach “which would require a
defendant to show that the consular assistance would, or could, have
made a difference in the outcome of the criminal trial.” 36
Mexico had argued to the ICJ that a violation should lead to
reversal, without further inquiry. Invoking the principle well known to
international law that the violation of an obligation requires
32.

Id. at 530.

33.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 29, at 8–21.

34.

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 65–
66 (Mar. 31).

35.

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Para. V. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. Pleadings 37, ¶ 2.18 (Apr. 7).

36.

Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P.3d 1184, 1187 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). See
generally QUIGLEY, ACEVES & SHANK, supra note 3, at 150–61.
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restoration of the status quo ante, Mexico said that if a foreign
national were convicted and sentenced without having been informed
about consular access, the conviction and sentence must be vacated.37
The ICJ rejected this automatic approach, saying that “it is for the
courts of the United States to examine the facts, and in particular the
prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation of the rights
set forth in the Convention.” 38
The ICJ, though it had come down on Mexico’s side on the issue
of an obligation to comply with consular access, tread lightly on the
issue of remedy. Said the ICJ, “[i]t is not to be presumed, as Mexico
asserts, that partial or total annulment of conviction or sentence
provides the necessary and sole remedy.” 39 What the ICJ was asking,
hence what the president was asking, was a hearing at which the
courts of Texas would have some discretion in analyzing the facts.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had in fact already given
its view of the impact of the VCCR violation. In ruling on an earlier
habeas corpus petition of Medellín’s, it said not only that he had
procedurally defaulted, but that even if he had not, his VCCR claim
would have failed because, according to the court, he had not shown
that lack of notification about consular access affected the validity of
his conviction or punishment. 40 So President Bush’s memorandum was
asking the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to make a finding of fact
it had already made. Nonetheless, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals instead challenged the president’s power to require it to
review its earlier decision.
B.

President Bush’s Mode of Seeking Implementation

The president treaded lightly in another way, and his decision in
this regard ultimately doomed the federal effort at gaining compliance
with the treaty obligation. The obligation of the United States qua
state rested on two separate but related bases. The United States was
obligated to comply with the VCCR consular access provision. On
that point, the United States took the view that an individual has no
right qua individual, despite the ICJ view to the contrary.
The second basis was the U.S. obligation to comply with a
decision of the ICJ in a case to which it was a party. This was the
obligation President Bush sought to implement by his memorandum,
despite the U.S. disagreement on the merits with the Avena ruling.
By virtue of the U.N. Charter, a state that is party to a case, as the
37.

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 58.

38.

Id. at 60.

39.

Id.

40.

Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing
Ex parte Medellín, No. WR–50, 191–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).
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United States here was, “undertakes” to comply with the Court’s
judgment, even if it considers the judgment wrong. 41
But President Bush treaded lightly in seeking implementation of
the Avena ruling. He framed the matter as a request, in apparent
expectation that the courts of the relevant states would comply,
presumably upon request by the foreign nationals whose fate was
involved. President Bush did not take direct action against the states
in question. The U.S. Attorney General had a basis for suing Texas,
either before making a request or after the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals declined, for frustrating the U.S. obligation to carry out a
judgment of the ICJ.
In fact, in other situations when another governmental authority’s
action has put the United States in violation of a treaty obligation,
the U.S. federal government has sued. It sued the State of
Washington for acts that put the United States in violation of the
fishing rights of Native Americans under treaties with tribes. 42 It has
sued municipalities that put the United States in violation of treaty
commitments by imposing property tax on diplomatic premises. 43 In
one instance, it sued the Sanitary District of Chicago, which was
diverting Lake Michigan waters in violation of a treaty on water
levels in the Great Lakes. 44 Here Texas was placing the United States
in violation of its U.N. Charter obligation—an obligation no one
contested—to comply with the Avena judgment.
Another of the anomalies was that the LaGrand and Avena cases
would not have reached the ICJ in the first place had the U.S. courts
provided the remedies required under international law for violation of
the obligation to inform a foreign national about consular access. The
U.S. courts should have heeded the advisory opinion of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, and even without that opinion
they should have provided remedies for violations of the obligation to
inform about consular access. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court had an
ideal opportunity to do so but instead ruled, in Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, on two issues in a way that would make it difficult for foreign
nationals to gain a remedy. It ruled, over and against the norm that a
treaty violation must be remedied if at all possible, that a foreign
national may not initiate legal action for a remedy for a VCCR
violation beyond the time permitted by the procedural law of the
particular state. 45 It ruled further that no remedy, at least the remedy
41.

U.N. Charter, art. 94, para. 1.

42.

See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).

43.

See United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Glen Cove, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971).

44.

See Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).

45.

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 357–60 (2006).

412

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of Treaties

of suppression of a pre-trial statement, is required for a VCCR
violation. 46 In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court assumed arguendo, as it had
done in Breard v. Greene, that the VCCR obligation to inform a
foreign national about consular access is self-executing, but again, it
did not decide that issue.

III. SELF-EXECUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS
In any event, as Medellín came back to the U.S. Supreme Court
for a second time, Texas argued that the issue was whether U.N.
Charter Article 94 was self-executing and said that it was not. 47 The
United States wrote in response as amicus curiae, but its brief read
like that of a party. Formally, the United States was not a party, but
certiorari had been granted on two questions, the first of which was
the power of the president to direct the courts of Texas as he had
done. The second was the more general question of whether the ICJ
judgment in Avena needed to be implemented judicially.
The United States disputed Texas’ proposition that the issue was
self-execution. Texas, the U.S. Attorney General wrote, “contends
that because the obligation to comply with Avena is not selfexecuting, the President lacks power to implement the decision. That
contention lacks merit.” 48 The U.S. Attorney General asserted a
power for the president to require compliance by Texas with U.N.
Charter Article 94. 49 The U.S. Attorney General regarded the selfexecution doctrine as irrelevant. 50
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, focused on the second question
on which it had granted certiorari. And on that question, it raised
self-execution as key to whether the ICJ judgment in Avena needed to
be implemented judicially. The Court provided little basis for taking
this approach to the case. All the Court said as it launched into a
self-execution analysis was that the “Court has long recognized the
distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic
law, and those that—while they constitute international law
commitments—do not by themselves function as binding federal
law.” 51 Then the Court cited cases in which a private party sought to
rely on a treaty provision, but none in which it was the federal
46.

Id. at 348–50.

47.

Brief for Respondent, at 19–20, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)
(No. 06–0984).

48.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 29, at 26.

49.

Id. at 10–11, 24–25, 28.

50.

Id. at 26–29.

51.

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008).
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government seeking to implement a treaty provision. 52 The Court did
not explain that it was taking self-execution into a new realm,
namely, situations of implementation by the federal executive.
In support of its view that self-execution was irrelevant, the
United States had cited in its brief amicus curiae the Gulf of Maine
case. 53 That case involved a 1984 ICJ determination of a maritime
boundary between the United States and Canada off the New
England coast. 54 As with Avena, the ICJ judgment in the Gulf of
Maine case was not welcomed by the United States. The Gulf of
Maine judgment was seen as a blow to U.S. fishing interests in the
New England states. Nonetheless, as with Avena, the president took
action to implement the judgment, by taking the appropriate
administrative action to fix a maritime line in accordance with the
ICJ judgment. 55 Even though the New England states and the fishing
industry were unhappy over the result, they acquiesced, and no legal
action was taken in opposition. The point the United States was
making by citing the Gulf of Maine was that when the treaty
obligation to comply with an ICJ judgment fails to be implemented,
the president can take appropriate action to that end.
Domestic measures taken by a president to implement a treaty
obligation had never been subjected to a self-execution analysis with
regard to the particular treaty provision. In the cases cited above in
which the federal government had to sue to secure compliance by
state-level authorities with a treaty obligation, no party raised selfexecution as an issue. 56 The self-execution doctrine was elaborated as
private parties sought rights based on a treaty. 57
That aspect of the self-execution doctrine was explained by the
Supreme Court in Edye v. Robertson (Head Money cases). 58 There,
the Court first said—and this is language the Court in Medellín
quotes—that a treaty is in the first instance a set of obligations
running between the states parties, and in case of breach they look to
52.

See id. at 504–05.

53.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 29, at 20.

54.

Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. V. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).

55.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 29, at 20.

56.

See Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); United States v.
Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).

57.

See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).

58.

Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
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each other for satisfaction. 59 But the Court in Edye immediately
followed that statement with an explanation of how treaty provisions
may create rights for individuals:
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain
rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing
in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature
of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as
between private parties in the courts of the country. An
illustration of this character is found in treaties, which regulate
the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the contracting
nations in regard to rights of property by descent or inheritance,
when the individuals concerned are aliens. The constitution of
the United States places such provisions as these in the same
category as other laws of congress by its declaration that “this
constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made or which shall be made under authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.” A treaty,
then, is a law of the land as an act of congress is, whenever its
provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private
citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are
of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it
as it would to a statute. 60

In Medellín, the Supreme Court gave a definition of self-executing:
What we mean by “self-executing” is that the treaty has
automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.
Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by itself give
rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a
treaty has domestic effect depends on implementing legislation
passed by Congress. 61

The definition in Medellín differs from the definition in the Head
Money cases in significant respects. First, the definition in Medellín
refers to the treaty as a whole rather than to a specific provision. In
this respect the definition in Medellín is at odds with the notion of
self-execution as the doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court in
the nineteenth century. In Percheman, for example, the treaty in
question provided for the transfer of Florida from Spain to the United
States, and for various consequences of that transfer. One consequence
related to the issue of rights in real property in Florida, and what
59.

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (quoting Edye v. Robertson, 112
U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).

60.

Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598–99.

61.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2.
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would become of those rights upon the transfer. In Percheman, it was
this provision—Article 8 of the treaty—that was relevant. No other
provision was relevant. Justice Marshall asked himself whether the
provision on real property rights in Article 8 was such that courts
should implement it. Had Spain refused to turn Florida over to the
United States—a matter dealt with elsewhere in the treaty—the
considerations on judicial implementation would have been quite
different. Today’s Supreme Court would likely agree with the
proposition that it is a question of a particular provision. Indeed, the
Court approvingly cites Percheman. 62
But the Medellín court’s definition casts doubt on whether a
treaty—or more precisely, a treaty provision—has any domestic
effect. Contrary to the Head Money definition, the Medellín definition
does not focus on the potential rights of a private party. If a treaty
has no “domestic effect,” it becomes questionable whether the
president could implement it over and against a state of the union.
The Court in Medellín went into no detail on the point, so one cannot
be sure what to conclude from its definition of self-executing. But if
taken seriously, the new definition might require that a treaty
provision be self-executing before the federal government could sue a
state to require implementation.
The doctrine of self-execution is one that comes into play when,
and only when, a treaty provision is relied upon by an individual. The
doctrine determines whether the individual may rely on the treaty
provision. But the doctrine has no relevance when the federal
government relies on a treaty provision against a state of the union,
or a sub-entity of a state of the union. Such is apparent from the
early cases, like Ware v. Hylton, in which private parties relied on a
treaty provision, and, indeed, on every self-execution case that has
arisen in the courts. 63
The Constitution, of course, requires the states to comply with
treaties. Treaties are declared to be “the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” 64 That language sounds as if it were written with
the Medellín case in mind. The Texas rules on procedural default fall
by the wayside in the face of a treaty obligation. The Supreme Court
has had little difficulty in finding treaty provisions to prevail over
state law. In one early case, the rights of a British creditor under the
62.

See id. at 514.

63.

See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).

64.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, TreatyBased Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082,
1101–08 (1992); Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 602–
03 (2007).
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debt restoration provisions of the Treaty of Paris ran counter to a
statute of limitations provision in Virginia law on the relevant
financial obligation. The Supreme Court said that that Virginia law
fell in the face of the treaty obligation to restore the debt. 65 The
dissenters in Medellín recited twelve prior cases of the Court in which
a treaty provision overrode state law. 66 Others could be added to their
list. 67 The dissenters, though they argued strongly that UN Charter
Article 94 was self-executing, did not pick up on the Attorney
General’s valid point that self-execution should not have been an issue
at all.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S READING OF UN CHARTER
ARTICLE 94
The Court could have minimized the damage of saying that selfexecution was relevant by a proper analysis of U.N. Charter Article
94. But it found Article 94 to be non-self-executing, and to reach that
result it engaged in reasoning that is hardly convincing. The Court
took Article 94 as a promise of future action, rather than an
obligation to be implemented by the courts, because, it said, the term
“undertakes” implies a need for future action. 68 A U.N. member state,
per Article 94, “undertakes to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”69
The Court distinguished “undertakes” from “shall” or “must.” Use of
one of these latter terms, it said, might have bespoken an intent “to
vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts.”70
The dissenters found the Court’s distinction between “undertakes” on
the one hand and “shall” or “must” on the other strained. 71 The
dissenters had the better side on this point. “Undertake” as a verb, or
“undertaking” as a noun, is used internationally to mean a firm
obligation. 72

65.

See, e.g., Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 457–58 (1806).

66.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 545 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

67.

Wu, supra note 64, at 584 n.31 (listing Supreme Court cases in which a
treaty provision overrode a state statute or policy).

68.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508.

69.

U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.

70.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508.

71.

See id. at 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

72.

See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563,
571 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The
Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 599, 661 (2008).
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Enforcement Mechanism in UN Charter Article 94

In a second point the Court took to show the non-self-execution of
Article 94, it references a mechanism provided by the second
paragraph of Article 94 for enforcement of ICJ judgments. Article
94(2) states:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other
party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if
it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 73

Citing this provision, the Court said, “The U.N. Charter’s
provision of an express diplomatic—that is, nonjudicial—remedy is
itself evidence that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable
in domestic courts.” 74 The Court did not explain why the existence of
a nonjudicial remedy is relevant to self-execution. The Court merely
cited its own decision in Sanchez-Llamas for this proposition. 75 In
Sanchez-Llamas, however, neither at the page cited or elsewhere, does
one find mention of any alternative remedy that might negate
domestic application of the treaty provision there in question. 76 The
Court here confused remedy with self-execution. Sanchez-Llamas was
decided on the issue of the availability of a remedy under a treaty
provision, not on the issue of self-execution.
In any event, the U.N. Security Council enforcement provision has
no relevance to whether U.N. Charter Article 94 is or is not selfexecuting. 77 The possibility of Security Council enforcement arises
only if a party does not comply. It has nothing to do with the issue of
how a party complies. The Court, moreover, mischaracterized the
Security Council enforcement provision as “the sole remedy for
compliance,” as if that excludes compliance through a proceeding in a
domestic court. 78 Security Council enforcement is the “sole” remedy at
the United Nations, but not necessarily the sole remedy overall.
The Court did not refer to prior self-execution situations and
whether the treaty provisions involved did or did not have some
enforcement mechanism. U.S. courts routinely allow invocation of
73.

U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.

74.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509.

75.

Id.

76.

See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006).

77.

Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 72, at 627, n.132
(“The existence of an international enforcement mechanism does not
suggest the unavailability of domestic enforcement.”).

78.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509.
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treaty provisions from treaties that provide an enforcement
mechanism. The most typical—a remedy found in a number of
treaties—is a dispute settlement process, often involving the ICJ. The
1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) with
Japan, for example, contains a clause allowing either party to refer a
dispute to the ICJ. 79 Yet Japanese litigants have successfully invoked
provisions of the Treaty as a basis for a right in courts of the United
States. In these cases, no issue has been raised that the provision
could not be invoked because of the possibility that Japan might sue
the United States in the event of breach. 80 The existence of an
enforcement mechanism in a treaty is irrelevant to the question of the
self-executing character of particular provisions. Were the Supreme
Court to take this position, it would require overturning established
case law affecting, in particular, treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation, like that with Japan. The ability of U.S. corporations to
operate effectively in the territory of states with which the United
States has such treaties would be jeopardized.
Texas argued in its brief that the enforcement mechanism
precluded self-execution of Article 94. 81 The United States, in its brief
as amicus curiae, responded that Texas:
[E]rrs in contending that the provision in the U.N. Charter that
permits a party to the agreement to seek enforcement of an ICJ
decision in the Security Council shows that the obligation to
comply with an ICJ decision may be enforced only
diplomatically or politically, and not through domestic courts.
That U.N. Charter provision simply recognizes that the political
branches of a Nation may choose not to comply with an ICJ
decision, and provides that, in that event, recourse to the
Security Council is the sole remedy. It does not address the
situation where, as here, the President decides to comply with
an ICJ decision and exercises authority under treaties to make
the decision judicially enforceable. 82

The U.S. view was more plausible than that of Texas or of the
Court. Resort to the Security Council enters the picture only in the
event of non-compliance with an ICJ judgment. Three noted
commentators on the U.N. Charter have written that “Article 94(2)
merely assures the aggrieved party of recourse to the Security Council
79.

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (U.S.-Japan), art.
24(2), Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063.

80.

Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 51 F.3d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1995); Fortino v.
Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).

81.

Brief of Respondent, supra note 47, at 20.

82.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 29, at 27 (internal citations omitted).
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in the event the other party fails to perform its obligations under a
judgment of the Court.” 83
In an attempt to bolster its point about an alternative
enforcement mechanism, the Court pointed out that the Security
Council would enjoy some discretion in whether or not to take action,
and that the United States holds veto power in the Security Council
and therefore could always prevent action against it for noncompliance with an ICJ judgment. 84 The Court reasoned that since
the United States knew it could avoid U.N. Security Council sanctions
by exercise of the veto, it must not have contemplated
implementation by domestic courts, since a decision by a domestic
court to implement an ICJ decision would deprive the United States
of its option to avoid the ICJ decision by vetoing a Security Council
resolution against the United States. 85
The exercise of a veto to defeat a Security Council resolution
against the United States for not complying with an ICJ decision, at
least if there were no excuse for the non-compliance, would be a
violation of its obligations under the Charter to act in good faith in
fulfilling their Charter obligations. 86 But that point aside, it is not
established that the United States ratified the UN Charter with the
unspoken understanding the Court ascribed to it. The Court cited
statements of administration figures at the Senate hearings preceding
ratification to try to establish that such was the understanding. 87 But
those statements merely recite that resort to the Security Council
would be a possibility in the event that the United States or any
other state were to decline to comply with an ICJ decision. 88 The
cited administration statements suggest nothing about the character
of the Article 94 obligation to comply with an ICJ decision as being
self-executing or not.
The Court said that if Article 94 were self-executing,
“[n]oncompliance with an ICJ judgment through exercise of the
Security Council veto . . . would no longer be a viable alternative.
There would be nothing to veto.” 89 Therefore, the United States must
have considered Article 94 to be non-self-executing. But apart from
the absence of historical evidence, there is little logic in the Court’s
83.

LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD ISAK HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA
SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 556 (1969).

84.

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509–10 (2008).

85.

Id. at 510.

86.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2.

87.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 510.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 510–11.
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reasoning. If a court were to implement an ICJ decision, that would
deprive the executive of the option to decline to comply. But to say
that the United States entered into a treaty obligation with a strategy
for non-compliance would cast serious doubt on the good faith of the
United States in becoming party to the UN Charter.
B.

ICJ Statute Articles 34(1) and Article 59

The Court relied on two other provisions of the treaty
establishing the ICJ, its statute, to show non-self-execution of Article
94. It referred to Article 34(1), which allows only states to be party to
a case, and Article 59, which provides that an ICJ decision “has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case.” 90 The Court cited these two articles as “further
evidence that the ICJ’s judgment in Avena does not automatically
constitute federal law judicially enforceable in United States courts.” 91
The Court said that these two articles mean that an ICJ decision
could not be used in a U.S. court by José Medellín, because he was
not, and could not have been, a party to the ICJ case. 92 The Court
did not explain why it is relevant that José Medellín, as a natural
person, could not, under Article 34(1), be a party to an ICJ case, in
particular to the Avena case. The Avena case, though brought by a
state, Mexico, was instituted to protect rights of its nationals,
including Medellín. The dissenters correctly pointed out that the
Article 94 obligation to comply may require a party to ICJ litigation
to afford a right that attaches to a national of the adverse party. 93
ICJ Statute Article 59, on which the Court also relied, likewise
provides little support for its conclusions. Article 59 says an ICJ
decision has binding force only between the parties, reflecting a
concern that ICJ decisions would not be taken as precedent in future
cases in the ICJ itself. 94 Article 59 has no relevance to domestic
implementation. 95

90.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59(1), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.

91.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 511.

92.

Id. at 512.

93.

Id. at 558–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

94.

See 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1175
(Bruno Simma ed., 2002) (describing how if the ICJ grants permission
for intervention, the intervening state does not become a party to the
dispute, and consequently, is not bound by the judgment).

95.

Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 72, at 647 (stating
that the Court’s reliance on Article 59 has “little to do with any version
of the self-execution question”).
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V. CONFLICT WITH PRIOR SELF-EXECUTION DECISIONS
Going beyond its self-execution analysis of U.N. Charter 94, the
Court generalized about standards for self-execution:
Given that ICJ judgments may interfere with state procedural
rules, one would expect the ratifying parties to the relevant
treaties to have clearly stated their intent to give those
judgments domestic effect, if they had so intended. Here there is
no statement in the Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, or the
ICJ Statute that supports the notion that ICJ judgments
displace state procedural rules. 96

The Court thus conceded that a treaty may override a state
procedural rule, but its reference to the need for a “statement” about
domestic effect appeared to require more than the Court had required
in prior cases. The dissenters objected to what appeared to be a
requirement of a more or less explicit indication in the treaty itself
that a provision was to be implemented by the judicial branch of
government. 97
What the Court intended was far from clear. It approvingly cited
Percheman as an instance of a treaty provision that was selfexecuting. 98 The Court in Medellín said that the reason for the result
in Percheman was that the language indicated the parties’ intent to
confirm the land grant “by force of the instrument itself.” 99 But the
treaty provision at issue in Percheman contained no “statement” that
it was to have domestic effect. The Supreme Court in Percheman
inferred an intent for judicial implementation on the basis of a clause
guaranteeing the continuation of property titles upon a change in
sovereignty in Florida from Spain to the United States. The clause
read: “[T]he grants shall remain ratified and confirmed to the persons
in possession of them.” 100 Nothing was said in the treaty as to how
this obligation should be implemented in the domestic law of the
United States. 101 There was nothing more in the treaty with Spain
than in the U.N. Charter on the domestic law implications.

96.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517.

97.

Id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

98.

See id. at 514.

99.

Id. at 514 (citing United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89
(1833)).

100. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States of
America and His Catholic Majesty (Spain-U.S.), art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819, 8
Stat. 252.
101. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833).
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The Court, in fact, has repeatedly found treaty provisions to be
self-executing when there was no “statement” in the text of the
treaty. 102 Indeed, such “statements” would be hard to find in any of
the treaties whose provisions the Court has found to be self-executing.
The treaty provision at issue in United States v. Rauscher read simply
as a set of obligations between Britain and the United States to
effectuate extradition for certain named criminal offenses. 103 The
treaty contained no “statement” about how the obligations were to be
put into effect in domestic law. 104 In Britain, of course, treaty
provisions never have domestic effect absent parliamentary
incorporation, so such a statement would have been unacceptable to
Britain. 105 Rauscher was extradited to the United States under the
treaty for one particular crime—murder. Once Rauscher was in the
United States, the prosecuting attorney filed an additional charge on
one other crime. The U.S. Supreme Court said Rauscher could invoke
the treaty provision and that the provision prohibited the normal
exercise of discretion of the prosecutor, because under the unwritten
law of extradition, a person extradited on one offense may not be
charged with another. 106 The treaty itself contained no “statement”
that the extradition provision might accord any rights to a person
being extradited or that it might displace procedural rules. 107 Yet the
Supreme Court found the treaty provision to afford a right to the
person surrendered that an additional charge not be filed.
The treaty provision at issue in Asakura v. City of Seattle simply
gave nationals of the United States and Japan the right to carry out
business in the other’s territory on a par with locals. 108 There was no
“statement” in the treaty that related to domestic enforcement. Yet
in Asakura and other cases, the Supreme Court has found a treaty
provision to be self-executing absent any “statement” that “supports”
domestic enforcement or the displacement of rules of domestic law.

102. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410–11 (1886).
104. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, U.S.-Britain, art. 10, Nov. 10, 1842, 8 Stat.
576.
105. See
generally
International
Humanitarian
Law:
National
Implementation, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/f80f8f25c8ba70cd41256486004ad095
/e259f85e9400552cc1256ba700532b80!OpenDocument (stating that “it is
frequently the case that the enactment of domestic legislation by
Parliament is a prerequisite for ratification of a treaty by the
government”).
106. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 410–11.
107. Id.
108. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340 (1924).

423

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of Treaties

Yet the Supreme Court has had no difficulty concluding that such
treaty provisions were self-executing. 109
In Sanchez-Llamas, as noted, the Court said before it can provide
a remedy for a treaty violation in a way that would apply in a state
court, the authority for a judicial remedy “must lie, if anywhere, in
the treaty itself.” 110 Putting that proposition together with the
requirement for explicitness for domestic enforcement per Medellín,
the chances for a treaty-based remedy in a domestic court of the
United States may seem remote. It is unclear just what the Court will
require in future cases. The Court’s statement in Sanchez-Llamas
about remedy is just as out of keeping with its own case law as the
statement in Medellín about domestic enforcement. In none of the
cases related above—Hopkirk, Rauscher, Asakura—was there any
mention of remedy in the treaty itself. Yet the Court provided a
remedy. As Lori Damrosch rightly said, “the Court has typically
afforded judicial remedies for treaty violations, regardless of whether
the treaty itself specified the availability of such remedies.” 111
Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas thus go at domestic enforcement
from two perspectives: Medellín from the perspective of domestic
application and Sanchez-Llamas from the perspective of remedy. With
respect to each, the Supreme Court is now seriously at odds with its
own prior cases, a fact that it does not acknowledge. It may be that
the Court in future will limit these extreme interpretations to certain
kinds of cases only. It is, to be sure, a greater acceptance of a treaty
obligation when that obligation requires compliance with the decisions
of an international court to be made in the future, whether or not the
reasoning of the international court passes muster. The Court in
Medellín referred to this circumstance. 112 The frailty of the analysis in
Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas may incline the Court in future to find
limitations or simply to ignore these cases.
When the Supremacy Clause was written, treaty provisions
related to a small range of issues. The proliferation of human rights
treaties from the mid-twentieth century has placed a strain on the
Supremacy Clause. The Court has confronted a similar problem in
implementation of the Alien Tort Claims Act, which, when adopted in
1789, applied to a narrow range of internationally defined torts. Now
the Act potentially encompasses a huge number. The Supreme Court
has shown itself reluctant to apply the Act to a broad range. 113
109. See id. at 341.
110. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006).
111. Lori F. Damrosch, Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas: Treaties from John
Jay to John Roberts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 460 (David L. Sloss et al. ed., 2011).
112. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518 (2008).
113. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
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The Court said that the courts of other states of the world would
not apply a comparable ICJ decision against that state as domestic
law. There is little domestic litigation one way or the other in the
courts of the world. Yet in the predecessor case, Medellín v. Dretke,
forty-six European governments and thirteen from Latin America filed
amicus curiae briefs in which they declared their courts would provide
a remedy in line with the Avena prescription, should the issue arise.

VI. MEANING OF MEDELLÍN FOR DEFENSIVE INVOCATION
OF A TREATY
The Supreme Court explained in a footnote in Medellín what it
meant by “self-executing” and “non-self-executing”:
The label “self-executing” has on occasion been used to convey
different meanings. What we mean by “self-executing” is that
the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification. Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not
by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law.
Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon
implementing legislation passed by Congress. 114

The American Bar Association-American Society of International
Law (ABA-ASIL) Joint Task Force on Treaties in U.S. Law took this
note to negate defensive invocation of a treaty provision if the
provision is deemed to be non-self-executing and to negate invocation
offensively under a statute that provides a cause of action such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 115 The Task Force was set up in
response to the Medellín decision. The Court’s definition of selfexecuting as applied to these two possible modes of invocation must
be regarded as dictum since neither was at issue in Medellín.
As for defensive invocation, the position stated in the Court’s
note would put the Court at odds with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which has explained that “non-self-executing” means only
that the relevant treaty provisions “will not create a private cause of
action in U.S. courts.” 116 The Committee definition would not
preclude defensive invocation, which is the way in which treaty
provisions are typically invoked in the criminal law context, and often
under FCN and other treaties. In a number of FCN treaty cases,
Japanese firms that hired Japanese nationals for executive positions
and were sued for discrimination invoked an FCN treaty provision
114. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2.
115. Am. Bar Assoc. & Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Joint Task Force on Treaties in
U.S. Law 9 (Working Paper, Mar. 16, 2009), available at http://
www.asil.org/files/TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf.
116. S. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 657.
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defensively to counter the allegation of discrimination. FCN treaty
provisions according rights are likely to be found self-executing, so
defensive invocation is likely to succeed in future cases.
As for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits relying on treaty provisions, some
lower courts have allowed such use on the rationale that § 1983
provides the cause of action. 117 Were the Supreme Court to insist on
such a broad view of non-self-execution, it would put the Court at
odds with these lower court decisions. It would also put the Court in
conflict with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s understanding
of non-self-execution. 118 The Senate has frequently appended a
declaration of non-self-execution to its resolutions giving consent to
the ratification of human rights treaties. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, as noted, means by self-execution only that no
private cause of action is created.

VII. MEANING OF MEDELLIN FOR EXECUTIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF A TREATY
The ABA-ASIL Task Force raises the prospect that the Court’s
view of self-execution in Medellín might even prevent the president
from acting to comply with treaty obligations. 119 This concern arises
from the Court’s definition, recited above, of self-execution. 120 The
Task Force considers the example of environmental or maritime-safety
treaties that create a mechanism for future standard-setting.
Standards set in this fashion are typically implemented for the United
States by the president. 121 Such concern would seem groundless,
however, because the self-execution doctrine as it has been elaborated
by the Supreme Court relates to judicial enforcement alone. The issue
arises under the Supremacy Clause, which concerns the courts, not
the executive branch.
The issue could arise if the president seeks to implement a treatybased obligation through the courts. Per Medellín, the president
might face a problem if the particular treaty provision is asserted to
be non-self-executing. The President would need to argue either that
the treaty provision is in fact self-executing, or that the doctrine of
self-execution does not apply when it is the President, rather than a
117. See, e.g., Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
118. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Declarations & Reservations, United States of America, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171(“[T]he United States declares that the provisions of
articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.”).
119. Am. Bar Assoc. & Am. Soc’y Int’l L., supra note 115, at 12.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 11.
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private party, seeking implementation. The Court in Medellín did not
squarely face the latter question because the moving party was
Medellín. The precedents cited above uniformly omit any need for
self-execution when it is the federal government suing a governmental
entity to require that entity to act in a way that will keep the United
States in compliance with a treaty obligation. 122
The president could, for example, even without relying on the
U.N. Charter Article 94 obligation to comply with an ICJ decision,
sue the state of Texas, in relation to any of the other foreign nationals
on death row there who were not informed about consular access, for
failing to implement that VCCR obligation. The federal executive
would, to be sure, have to alter its own view of what is required as a
remedy for a consular access violation. If the Supreme Court were to
say that self-execution is required even when the president sues, the
president would have to argue that the obligation to inform about
consular access is self-executing, an issue that the Supreme Court, as
noted, left open in the Sanchez-Llamas case. Properly, of course, selfexecution is irrelevant when the president sues.
In one context in which the executive branch has sued to
implement a treaty obligation, namely, the imposition of property tax
by a local government on premises entitled to diplomatic immunity, it
would seem absurd to raise the question of whether that treaty
obligation is self-executing. In that situation, unlike that in Medellín,
no individual is involved at all. It is simply a question of U.S.
implementation of the rights of a foreign state under an obligation
based either on a treaty or on customary law not to require the
payment of property tax. In the lower court cases decided to date on
that issue, self-execution was never mentioned as being necessary for
the federal government to gain a judgment against the local
governmental entity. 123 Self-execution comes into play, at least in the
cases decided by the Supreme Court to date, only when it is a private
party seeking implementation.

VIII. DECLARATION IN A SENATE RESOLUTION OF
CONSENT
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reacted to Medellín by
deciding that it should include a declaration in each treaty it proposes
to the Senate for advice and consent that the treaty either is or is not
self-executing. 124 There is some imprecision in such an approach,
because it is unlikely that each and every provision of any treaty will
122. See supra notes 42 to 44 and accompanying text.
123. See United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982); United
States v. City of Glen Cove, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971).
124. See S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 110-12, § VIII(B) (2008).
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be self-executing. The Senate, for example, proposed such a
declaration to be included in the advice and consent resolution for the
2003 Extradition Treaty Between the European Union and the United
States of America. While most of the Treaty’s provisions are to be
applied by the courts as they consider an extradition request, some
create strictly government-to-government obligations, such as an
article providing for review of the treaty after five years. 125 The
Senate gave consent to the Extradition Treaty subject to the
declaration, which read, “[t]his Treaty is self-executing.” 126
There is some danger in the Committee’s approach. If it becomes
practice to include such a declaration, then if in a particular treaty no
such declaration is included, the courts might draw a negative
inference. Moreover, what the Court seemed to require was a
statement in the treaty itself. It is unclear whether the Court would
consider sufficient a declaration that is not contained in the treaty’s
text.

IX. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPERATIONAL RULE
David Sloss has persuasively argued that the courts apply the
Supremacy Clause differently depending on the identity of the
defendant. 127 If a private party claims a treaty-based right against
another private party, the courts incline to find the treaty provision
self-executing and to consider that a remedy is required. If a private
party claims a treaty-based right against a governmental entity, the
courts incline to find the treaty provision non-self-executing and to
consider that no remedy is required. That result is particularly
pronounced if the private party is being prosecuted for crime and
seeks to rely on the treaty-based right to oppose the prosecution.128
Nothing on the face of the Supremacy Clause justifies this differential
approach. But asserting a treaty-based right against a governmental
entity seems to evoke concern in the judiciary that the United States
is being ruled from outside, whereas when the rights of two private
parties are at issue, the matter is viewed simply as one in which the
government has, by treaty, provided for a particular result.
This distinction, based in realpolitik more than legal principle,
may well account for the unfortunate analysis seen in Medellín. A
125. Extradition Treaty Between the European Union and the United States
of America, art. 21, June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.
126. 154 CONG. REC. 20167 (Sept. 23, 2008).
127. See generally David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 504 (David
Sloss ed., 2009) (analyzing the impact of the Supremacy Clause on a
“database of cases”).
128. See id.
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foreign entity, the ICJ, was telling the United States it had to provide
Medellín a right, albeit a right that likely would not have benefited
Medellín in the long run, in contravention of the procedural law of a
state of the union.
Treaty-based rights running against the government have been
enforced by the courts. In Rauscher, the relief sought based on a
treaty ran against a governmental entity. The U.S. Supreme Court
told a federal prosecutor to drop a criminal charge.129 With the
proliferation of human rights treaties in the late twentieth century,
however, the potential for interfering with governmental action
affecting individuals increased exponentially. The courts began to look
more carefully at rights-creating provisions of treaties when the right
ran against the government. 130 The Senate reacted in the approval
process for treaties by inserting in rights-giving treaties a declaration,
albeit a declaration of unclear meaning and effect, that rights
provisions were to be deemed non-self-executing.
Such rights, of course, are rights that the United States has
agreed, by virtue of adhering to a particular treaty, to implement. So
the attitude that something is being imposed from outside is not
based on a logical analysis. If the United States regards it as
beneficial, whether to secure better protection for U.S. nationals at
the hands of other states of the world, or for any other reason, to
enter into a treaty that provides for rights, then it is the United
States that is making the decision that a particular right needs to be
respected.
To be sure, that decision is being made at the federal level. What
comes through in Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas opinions is a concern
on the part of the Supreme Court that the federal government is
overriding the rights of the states. What the judges are ignoring is
that entry into a treaty requires the approval of two-thirds of the U.S.
Senate (of members present and voting) and that the Senate was set
up under the Constitution to provide representation for states. The
advice and consent process allows the states to keep the federal
government from entering into treaties that may have effects adverse
to the interests of the states. If the states, as represented in the
Senate, do not want the federal executive to enter into a particular
treaty, they can readily prevent it.
The Supreme Court in Medellín poses, as if it were an
unacceptable outcome, the prospect that the ICJ might make a bad
decision. 131 Would it need to be implemented by the United States?
129. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886).
130. See Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow,
International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE
J. INT’L L. 51, 63–65 (2012).
131. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 517–18.
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The answer is yes. In the law one often finds rules that lead to a
result that is less than pleasant. A criminal suspect who committed
an outrageous crime and who admitted to it may be able to suppress
that statement because the constable blundered by not advising about
constitutional rights. Yet we live with such results, on the rationale
that the rule is necessary.

X. TREATIES IN PRIVATE LAW CASES POST-MEDELLÍN
In a 2012 article, Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy, and Sara
Aronchick Solow claim that the lower courts have taken the more
stringent requirement suggested in Medellín beyond the context of
rights sought against governmental entities and are applying it across
the board to all treaty-based claims, including suits against private
parties. 132 They argue that there has now occurred an “end to the
carve-out for private law.” 133 They cite a few examples. 134
However, cases decided in the lower courts post-Medellín
involving reliance on a treaty-based right against a private party
reveal that the impact of Medellín in that realm is slight. Cases
involving self-execution in treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation, and in a major treaty on international sale of goods
appear unaffected. Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, a treaty not implemented by
congressional legislation, Japanese companies have the right to hire
executive personnel of their own choosing and routinely win cases
filed by Anglo-Americans who claim discrimination for being passed
over. 135 This Treaty has no “statement” like that demanded by the
Court in Medellín.
Medellín has been disregarded in cases arising under the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which
regulates the sale of goods between private parties located in different
countries. 136 The CISG has not been implemented by congressional
legislation. Its articles prescribing rights and obligations for parties to
a covered sale are considered self-executing. 137 It is applied as self132. Hathaway, McElroy & Solow, supra note 130, at 71.
133. Id. at 73.
134. See id. at 73–76.
135. See Trisko v. Nitto Kohki, No. 10-CV000281, 2011 WL 4345837 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 13 2011); Weber v. FujiFilm Med. Sys., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d
219 (D. Conn. 2012).
136. See Convention on the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3.
137. FRANCO FERRARI, CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS:
APPLICABILITY AND APPLICATIONS OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS SALES
CONVENTION 32–33 (2012).
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executing by U.S. courts, even though its text contains no statement
calling for self-execution. 138
The Medellín case generated speculation as to whether the selfexecuting character of the CISG might be revisited. 139 However, the
courts have continued to apply the CISG. In a 2011 case, the Eighth
Circuit applied the CISG to a suit between two private parties,
without commenting on why it applied. 140 The Southern District of
New York, applying the CISG in another 2011 case, did mention the
fact that it considered the CISG to be self-executing: “The CISG is a
self-executing treaty, binding on all signatory nations, that creates a
private right of action in federal court under federal law. As a treaty,
the CISG is a source of federal law.” 141 The court did not mention
Medellín as imposing any requirements that might negate the selfexecuting character of CISG obligations.
In a 2012 case in which the plaintiff argued that the CISG applied
to a contract, another U.S. district court said, “The Court agrees that
because the United States and China are both CISG signatories, the
CISG governs the contracts.” 142 The court said nothing further about
application of the CISG. 143Again in 2012, still another U.S. district
court, when implementing CISG, characterized it as self-executing.144
In support, the court did cite Medellin, but only the passages in
Medellin that refer to Foster & Elam for the proposition that some
treaty provisions are self-executing. 145 The district court did not cite
the pages in Medellín that require a statement that suggests selfexecution.
The courts appear to be ignoring the prescriptions of Medellín in
regard to one category of treaty that provides individual rights
against the government, namely, treaties aimed at preventing double
taxation of income by more than one state. Provisions in such treaties
that protect an individual from paying tax twice on the same income
138. See Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 72, at 637 n.175.
139. See Mark Cantora, The CISG After Medellin v. Texas: Do U.S.
Businesses Have It? Do They Want It?, 8 J. INT’L BUSINESS & LAW 111,
112 (2009).
140. Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., 635 F.3d 1106, 1107
(8th Cir. 2011).
141. Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal citation omitted).
142. Maxxsonics USA, Inc. v. Fengshun Peiying Electro Acoustic Co., No.
10-C-1174, 2012 WL 962698, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2012).
143. See id.
144. Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No.
10-05321, 2012 WL 2835543, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012).
145. See id.
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are regarded as self-executing. 146 Such treaties typically lack specific
language calling for self-execution, yet taxpayers have been allowed to
rely on provisions that would benefit them. In a 2009 case in which a
taxpayer relied on a taxation treaty with Canada, 147 the U.S. Court of
Appeals entertained the taxpayer’s argument to determine whether
the treaty provision resulted in the redress sought, without referring
to the doctrine of self-execution or to Medellín. 148 In a 2012 case, the
U.S. Tax Court referred to the provisions of a tax treaty with France
to determine whether the taxpayer was exempt from taxation in the
United States on certain income. 149
Another aspect of Medellin that is being ignored in private law
cases is the Court’s view that the presence of an enforcement
mechanism negates self-execution. The Japan-U.S. FCN treaty, as
noted, contains such a mechanism, namely, a clause allowing suit in
the ICJ where either Japan or the United States considers the other
to be in violation. 150 In a 2011 U.S. district court case, an AngloAmerican was fired by a Japanese company operating in the United
States. 151 He sued, alleging discrimination in violation of U.S.
legislation. The court found his allegations ill-founded but said that
even if they were, they would be barred by provisions in the JapanU.S. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty that afford
complete freedom in selection of executive staff. 152 The Court did not
mention Medellín. In a 2012 case involving a similar issue, another
U.S. district court likewise allowed a Japanese employer to rely on the
Japan-U.S. FCN treaty. 153 As noted, the provision of that Treaty on
executive hiring continues to be implemented. The lower courts in
post-Medellín cases simply do not mention the enforcement
mechanism or the Court’s mention of enforcement mechanisms as a
factor negating self-execution.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Medellín, to be sure, mentioned FCN
treaties, as examples of treaties the Court in the past had held to be

146. See Wu, supra note 64, at 643.
147. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.Canada, Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087.
148. See Jamieson v. Comm’r, 584 F.3d 1074, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
149. See Letourneau v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1229 (T.C. 2012).
150. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 79, art.
24(2).
151. Trisko v. Nitto Kohki, No. 10-CV000281, 2011 WL 4345837, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 13, 2011)
152. Id.
153. See Weber v. FujiFilm Med. Sys., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 219, 230 (D.
Conn. 2012).
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self-executing in certain of their provisions. 154 The Court did not seem
to criticize those past decisions. It said that the FCN treaties were
held to be self-executing based on their language. 155 But if one
examines those FCN treaties, one finds nothing like the “statement”
the Court said would be necessary to hold a treaty provision selfexecuting. And past FCN treaties have had enforcement provisions; a
feature that the Court in Medellín says disqualifies a treaty’s
provision as self-executing. Those past FCN treaties thus do not meet
the new requirements on two grounds. By the Court’s reasoning in
Medellín, an FCN treaty that simply provides, as do most, for certain
rights for foreign nationals in the territory of the other contracting
party, and which, as many do, provide an enforcement mechanism,
might fail the Court’s test for self-execution.

XI. CONCLUSION
Medellín involved the hardest possible situation for self-execution,
since what was at issue was not a statement one could find in the
treaty, but a decision made by a judicial organ created by a treaty. A
narrow reading of the holding in Medellín is that that it relates solely
to the self-executing character of U.N. Charter Article 94, or at least
to treaty provisions that require compliance with the decision of a
treaty-created judicial organ. 156 The Court’s apparent requirement of
a “statement” is ambiguous, particularly when taken together with
the Court’s apparent approval of a self-execution finding in prior
cases involving treaties lacking such a “statement.” If the Court
meant to overrule its prior cases, it could have done so. It did not. It
purported to preserve its prior case law. Lower courts, even those that
do not simply ignore Medellín, may be able to resist suggestions that
are likely to be made by counsel that Medellín requires far-reaching
restrictions on self-execution.

154. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008).
155. Id.
156. See Curtis Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-executing
Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540 (2008) (noting this factor though not
quite suggesting that the decision is limited to this factual
circumstance).
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